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Buford George is a fifty-three-year-old diagnosed schizophrenic
with violent and criminal tendencies who can often be found on the
sidewalk along Mission Street in San Francisco. Over the past
twenty years, George has been in and out of jail, mental institutions,
and homelessness.2 In 1980, he was arrested for assaulting a woman
and released when the case resulted in a deadlocked jury.' He was
placed under conservatorship between 1984 and 1986, arrested again
in 1998, and released after fifteen months of treatment because he
was found competent to stand trial.4 In between episodes such as
these, he can usually be found near Fourth and Mission Streets with a
"constantly evolving collection of old luggage and clothing" and
speaking mostly in unintelligible mumbles. Douglas R. Korpi, a San
Francisco court psychologist, commented, "I just can't even begin to
tell you how common this is."
6
Since 1969, California has been operating under the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act ("LPS Act"), which allows the state to release
patients from mental hospitals and limits the state's right to detain
people who are mentally ill.7 Whereas people like George once
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would have been indefinitely committed to a hospital for treatment,
now the mentally ill are left to fend for themselves, cycling between
homelessness, seventy-two hour detentions for treatment and
evaluation, and prison.
Although the LPS Act and most civil commitment statutes
include provisions for both people who are classified as either
dangerous to themselves or others, and those who are gravely
disabled, the focus of this Note will be on the mentally ill who are
gravely disabled. Gravely disabled people often fall into an
amorphous category that engenders minimal interest in the
community at large.' Although society is concerned about the
mentally ill who are dangerous, there is more apathy for the non-
violent mentally ill.9 A lack of funding and services for the mental
health system reflects this apathy."0
The current situation has enormous consequences for the
mentally ill; it is an entrenched system that often produces
homelessness, violence, and death." This Note argues that the LPS
Act does not adequately provide for the mentally ill because it entails
a cumbersome process that strikes a balance too far toward
preserving due process rights. Part I provides an overview of
California's mental health system. Part II will argue that the LPS Act
makes confinement and treatment too difficult and does not include
an affirmative right to treatment, thereby forcing the mentally ill to
face miserable consequences. Part III points out that the LPS Act has
the ironic result of unfairly depriving the mentally ill of liberty since
many are imprisoned for minor crimes. This Note concludes by
arguing that solutions to this problem should include changes in
funding and services so that the mental health system provides
adequate treatment for the gravely disabled. The LPS Act needs to
be transformed to emphasize the right to quality treatment and to
provide alternatives to confinement in institutions.
It is important to distinguish what this Note does not argue. It
does not advocate involuntarily confining anyone who merely exhibits
the symptoms of mental illness. More importantly, it does not
advocate indefinite confinement of the mentally ill. This Note simply
points out inconsistencies and illogical processes in the LPS Act that
result in inadequate treatment for the mentally ill-people who face
difficulty fending for themselves.
8. See E. FULLER TORREY, M.D., OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING
AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 1-3 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 13-24.
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I. Overview of the Mental Illness System
A. History of Mental Illness Law and the Civil Rights Movement
Many of the problems the mentally ill face in receiving treatment
can be traced to a procedure known as deinstitutionalization, which is
the process of releasing the mentally ill from treatment in hospitals
and then closing these hospitals.12 Beginning in 1955, there was a
nationwide policy of deinstitutionalization that corresponded with the
widespread introduction of chlorpromazine, more commonly known
as Thorazine, "the first effective antipsychotic medication."13
Thorazine made it easier to control a patient and mask his symptoms,
as long as he continued to take the medication.14 Thus, the state
decreased spending on care and treatment of the mentally ill and
instead relied on the "wonder drug."'5
The process of deinstitutionalization has had a profound effect
on treatment of the mentally ill in this country. According to
psychiatrist Dr. Torrey, without deinstitutionalization, 92% of the
people who would have been hospitalized in 1955 were not by 1994.16
Even accounting for people who would have been treated in general
hospitals or community mental health centers, 763,391 mentally ill
people who would have been hospitalized forty years ago are part of
the general population in the United States, a number commensurate
in size to the population of San Francisco.17
The situation also changed politically for the mentally ill in the
mid-1960s. Civil rights attorneys, rather than mental health
professionals, turned their attention to involuntary hospitalization
and pointed to the fact that the use of community mental health
programs and the extensive use of psychotropic drugs made
12. Id. at 8-11. Dr. Torrey terms this process a "Psychiatric Titanic" due to its
tendency to play a major part in the mental illness crisis. Id.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. Although one would hope that this process would be restricted to borderline
cases of mental illness, in fact this is not the case. Unfortunately, many people who were
deinstitutionalized were among the severely mentally ill. Id. at 10. This emphasis on
medicating the mentally ill instead of "fostering services to let them lead productive lives"
has hampered actual treatment of these people. Report Says Mental Health System Not
Meeting Needs, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 17, 2002, at A4.
16. TORREY, supra note 8, at 9.
17. Id. Ironically, many people were discharged from hospitals without receiving
follow-up treatment. Id. at 10. Thus, instead of helping the situation,
deinstitutionalization exacerbates the problem because these individuals were unable to
successfully transition to living in the community when there were no longer beds
available for them in the hospital. Id.
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involuntary hospitalization "less advised and less necessary." 8 This
climate produced California's LPS Act in 1967 and court decisions
such as Lessard v. Schmidt, which restricted Wisconsin's power to
commit people involuntarily. 9 Subsequent decisions added new
procedural due process protections to the commitment process.0
The United States Supreme Court joined the debate in 1975 with
O'Connor v. Donaldson. The plaintiff in this case had been
committed in a Florida state mental hospital for fifteen years even
though he was not dangerous to himself or others and was not
involved in a treatment program.2 The Court held that a finding of
"mental illness," without more, could not justify keeping someone in
indefinite custodial confinement.23 However, the Court stopped short
of declaring a right to treatment or even articulating acceptable
criteria for confinement. Four years later the Court decided
Addington v. Texas, a case in which the appellant sued the state when
his mother committed him indefinitely. 4 The appellant contested
commitment asserting that he was not gravely disabled, although he
admitted having a mental illness.25 A jury committed him for an
indefinite period on the state's evidence that he suffered from serious
delusions, threatened to injure his parents, assaulted people while
hospitalized, and caused property damage at his parents' home.26 He
appealed, alleging that the standards for commitment violated his
substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court held that due
process requires a higher standard than a regular civil proceeding if it
18. Stephan J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 55 (1982); see also Grant H.
Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retrospective and
Prospective Assessment, 60 TUL. L. REV. 927 (1986). However, as this note will argue
later, deinstitutionalization has not resulted in community mental health treatment. See
infra notes 69-155 and accompanying text.
19. 349 F. Supp. 1.078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In Lessard, the district court found that
Wisconsin's civil commitment process did not provide adequate protection of due process
rights. Id. The court required of the institution adequate notice, right to counsel, a
probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of detention, burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, availability of privilege against self-incrimination, and a speedy hearing.
Id. There were further proceedings, with the Supreme Court remanding the case twice.
See Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
However, these further proceedings have not challenged the underlying holding. See
Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
20. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1979) (establishing a
reasonable doubt standard and requiring a unanimous jury to appoint a conservator).
21. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
22. Id. at 567-69.
23. Id. at 575.
24. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
25. Id. at 421.
26. Id. at 420-21.
27. Id. at 421.
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might result in indefinite commitment, finally settling on the clear and
convincing standard.28 In Mills v. Rogers, the Court agreed that the
state could recognize a constitutionally protected right of mentally ill
patients to refuse drug therapy." The Court explained that because
states can recognize greater liberty interests than the federal
government, the district court was justified in finding that involuntary
commitment provides no basis to infer the person is incompetent
without a further judicial finding.3"
In response to these legal decisions and concern for the rights of
the mentally ill, commentators noted that "[t]he balance between ...
liberty and autonomy on the one hand, and the state's paternalistic
right to confine.., persons involuntarily on the other, has clearly
shifted to a preference for liberty."'" However, many mental health
professionals argue that this shift towards liberty
(deinstitutionalization) has only led to devastating consequences for
the mentally ill. 2 Instead of enjoying their liberty, the mentally ill are
left afraid and alone.3 These commentators have sardonically noted
that the result of civil rights lawyers meddling in the mental illness
field is that the mentally ill are "[dying] with their rights on."'"
B. The LPS Act
California's "preference for liberty" began with the LPS Act.35
Enacted in 1969, this Act repealed indefinite detention and
emphasized voluntary treatment with periods of involuntary
intervention for people who are unable to care for themselves.36 It
authorizes a seventy-two hour detention of any person who is either a
danger to himself or others or who is gravely disabled, in order to
provide for observation and crisis treatment. At the end of this
28. Id. at 432-33.
29. 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982).
30. Id. at 298-302.
31. Morse, supra note 18, at 55.
32. Darold A. Treffert, The Practical Limits of Patients' Rights, in PSYCHIATRISTS
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE 227 (Richard J. Bonnie ed., 1977).
Even further, some commentators have used the term "rotting with their rights on" to
describe the condition where doctors abandon their patients, preferring instead to use
drugs to treat them. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital
Case: "Involuntary Mind Control;" the Constitution and the "Right to Rot," 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 720, 723 (1980).
33. See Treffert, supra note 32, at 227.
34. Id.
35. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West 1998) (effective July 1, 1969).
36. Id.
37. "Gravely disabled" is defined as "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a
mental disorder, is unable to provide for his.., personal needs for food, clothing, or
shelter." Id. § 5008(h)(1)(A).
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term, the state may certify the patient for an additional fourteen days
under certain conditions."8 There is an automatic certification review
hearing, conducted by a judge, for persons certified for this intensive
treatment.39 The patient may be confined for an additional period of
up to 180 days if the judge determines he is dangerous to others in
this hearing.4 The program must make progress reports every ninety
days and give a final report at the end of 180 days. The statute also
authorizes a judge to appoint a conservator for any person found
gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and the judge may
specify the conservator's powers.4 ' These powers may include any
power that could be granted to a conservator under the Probate
Code, such as payment of debts, management of property and the
estate, and defense of the conservatee's estate.43 The patient may also
be given medication involuntarily if he or she is found incapable of
refusing treatment in a separate hearing.44  The state or the
conservator may renew these powers every year.
The first judicial test of the LPS Act was Thorn v. Superior
Court, where a hospital challenged the law after a non-profit legal
service sought to apprise the patients of their rights. 46 The California
Supreme Court upheld the LPS Act holding that it contained suitable
safeguards to protect patients. The LPS Act protects due process
rights by repealing indefinite commitment and upholding the rights to
counsel and habeas corpus.4' Although amended after Doe v.
Gallinot, which held that due process requires a mandatory hearing in
connection with certification for a fourteen-day intensive treatment,
49
the LPS Act has otherwise remained intact to this day. Under
Conservatorship of Roulet, the court expanded protections for the
38. Id. § 5250. These conditions include: the professional staff providing evaluation
has analyzed the person's condition and has found him gravely disabled, the facility is
designated to provide intensive treatment and agrees to admit the person, and the person
is unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily. Id. Furthermore a person is not "gravely
disabled" if he can survive safely with the help of responsible family and friends who are
willing and able to provide for that person. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 5300.
41. Id. § 5305.
42. Id. § 5350. This same provision does not exist for people confined as a result of
being a danger to themselves or others.
43. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1852 (West 1991); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357.
44. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Ct. App. 1987).
45. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350.
46. 464 P.2d 56 (Cal. 1970).
47. Id. at 62.
48. Id.
49. 657 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1981). Previously a patient had to request a writ of
habeas corpus for this hearing; the Ninth Circuit felt this left too much burden on patients
for effective protection. Id. at 1022-23.
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mentally ill, requiring a unanimous jury to find a person gravely
disabled beyond a reasonable doubt before appointing a
conservator.0
C. Current State of Mental Health Care
The procedure for determining mental incapacity has remained
virtually unchanged since the LPS Act was adopted in 1969. A
person may be detained for seventy-two hours if a peace officer or
certain professionals find probable cause that the person is gravely
disabled." In order to be certified for limited treatment, the person
must be found gravely disabled by a preponderance of the evidence. 2
Determination of incapacity, required for involuntary treatment,
must be made by clear and convincing evidence at an evidentiary
hearing. 3 Furthermore, the state (or a conservator) must show that a
patient is presently disabled-not that he may relapse in the future."
Absent a judicial determination of incompetence, there must be
informed consent before giving drug treatment.5 One of the cardinal
principles of the LPS Act is that the court will not presume that
mental patients are incompetent because of their need for
hospitalization.56
In practice, under the LPS Act, if a police officer or health
official suspects a person is gravely disabled as a result of a mental
disorder, he or she can detain that person under a probable cause
standard for seventy-two hours.7 The evidence required to authorize
detention does not have to be gathered under a search warrant, and it
is not subject to the exclusionary rule. A doctor can certify a person
for an intensive fourteen-day treatment with a certification review
hearing under a preponderance of the evidence standard.59 In these
early intervention steps, the LPS Act does not require much evidence,
and these cases usually hinge on the word of the official involved. 
6
Furthermore, the usual constitutional safeguards do not apply since
the emphasis is on treating a person in a crisis. On the other hand, if
the state wishes to appoint a conservator it must prove its case in an
50. 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998). See also In re Azzarella, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 922, 924 (Ct. App. 1989).
52. Azzarella, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
53. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (Ct. App. 1987).
54. Conservatorship of Neal, 235 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (Ct. App. 1987).
55. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
56. Id.
57. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998).
58. Conservatorship of Susan T., 884 P.2d 988, 997 (Cal. 1994).
59. In re Azzarella, 254 Cal. Rptr. 922, 926 (Ct. App. 1989).
60. See Conservatorship of Johnson, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 47 (Ct. App. 1991).
January 2003]
evidentiary hearing beyond a reasonable doubt.6' Furthermore, if the
state (or a conservator, if appointed) then wants to treat that confined
mentally ill person who is refusing treatment, it must prove in a later
hearing that the person is incompetent by clear and convincing
evidence.62
Thus, it is relatively easy to provide confinement and crisis
treatment to someone who is unable to provide for his own basic
personal needs. However, outside of a crisis situation it is much more
difficult to provide treatment that will make a difference. Although
California recognizes the need to exercise its parens patriae power
and will lower safeguards to treat the mentally ill in crises, it is far
more difficult to protect and treat people who suffer from chronic
mental illness.
In this way the LPS Act scrupulously protects patients' rights at
the expense of protecting the patient. Although the Act states that its
purpose is to provide treatment,63 in reality it prevents the state from
providing care for many mentally ill people and never proposes a
right to treatment. As previously discussed, all too often the
unfortunate effect of the LPS Act is that people who are gravely
disabled and unable to receive treatment become homeless.
Furthermore, this so-called "liberty" is often illusory since the fate of
most mentally ill homeless is arrest for petty crimes, ending in
involuntary and stigmatizing confinement on worse terms than
hospitalization.
However, by broadening the right to involuntarily commit
someone, California would offer the Scylla of the state-run mental
institution to the Charybdis of homelessness and the criminal justice
system. In Wyatt v. Aderholt, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a right to
treatment after noting that the inadequate environment of the state-
run mental hospital was "a far cry from the humane psychological and
physical environment the district court envisioned as sine qua non of
rehabilitative treatment." '  The court graphically described the
inhumane treatment of patients. The hospital afforded no privacy
and had numerous health and safety problems.6 The state spent little
funding on comfort for the patients and the food "[came] closer to
'punishment' by starvation than nutrition. ' 6
In addition to the unpleasant conditions, the institution also
lacked any real therapeutic value due to severe understaffing. There
was one medical doctor with psychiatric training for 5,000 patients,
61. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 4, 11 (Cal. 1979).
62. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211 (Ct. App. 1987).
63. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1998).
64. 503 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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one psychologist for every 1,670 patients, and one or two non-
professional aides for as many as 200 patients.67 Since there is no right
to treatment, the Associate Commissioner for Mental Retardation for
the Alabama Department of Mental Health testified, "the physical
environment was inadequate for treating inmates [because] 'we don't
have the staff, we don't have the facilities, nor do we have the
financial resources."'" It is understandable that California might
want to spare the mentally ill from similar, appalling conditions by
narrowing the criteria for commitment. However, those with mental
illnesses who are not committed to avoid subjecting them to such
horrible conditions are, nonetheless, unprotected and highly
vulnerable.
D. Mental Health Alternatives
In an attempt to turn the mental illness battle into a fight for
mental health, President Carter established a Commission on Mental
Health. 69 In broad terms the Commission recommended that the
federal government build a network of comprehensive services so
that communities could provide for mentally ill patients and limit
commitment in large institutions.7" It advocated a move toward
community-based programs so that care could be provided in halfway
houses, family and group homes, private hospitals and offices, foster-
care settings, and community mental health centers in order to
integrate social services with formal mental health care.71 The
Commission recognized that many groups of mentally ill people are
underserved, if not unserved, and the needs of people with chronic
mental illness must be prioritized.72
To meet the special needs of people with long-term and severe
mental disorders, the Commission fashioned a plan that would assure
high quality institutional care when required. The need for
institutional care would be minimized with follow-up services and
community-based alternatives combined with job placement
assistance and higher Supplemental Security Income payments. 3 The
Commission stated that procedural protections should include a clear
and convincing evidentiary burden, initial screening by mental health
agencies, and a comprehensive evaluation of functional abilities.74 In
67. Id. at 1311.
68. Id. at 1310.
69. See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1978).
70. Id. at 35.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 17, 22.
73. Id. at 22-26.
74. Id. at 70-71.
addition, courts should tailor guardianship to cover only those
activities with which the patient needs help.75  Central to the
Commission's idea of providing protection was the need to include a
statutory right to humane and therapeutic treatment that could not be
denied due to a lack of funding. 76 To implement its plan, the
Commission recommended a federal grant and an appropriation of at
least $75 million for the first year and $100 million for the next two
years. Unfortunately, the Commission's findings and resulting
legislation never passed through Congress; if it had, the shape of
mental illness law would look startlingly different. Nevertheless, the
mental health utopia they envisioned could provide guidance to
states.
Sounding a similar theme, the United States Supreme Court in
Olmstead v. L.C. also advocated a community-based alternative for
treatment of the mentally ill.77 In Olmstead, mentally ill and mentally
disabled patients sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), arguing that their confinement in a mental institution
violated its anti-discrimination provisions.78 The Court noted that
Congress described the segregation and isolation of the mentally ill as
a serious and pervasive form of discrimination that the ADA was
designed to eliminate.79 Under the ADA, people with disabilities may
not be denied participation in public services." One regulation
requires public entities to administer treatment programs in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities. The Supreme Court held that states must place
persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than
institutions when treatment professionals determine that community
placement is appropriate."
The trial court in Olmstead held that unnecessary segregation in
an institution was discrimination per se, which could not be justified
by lack of funding. The Supreme Court went further, qualifying this
right. The Court held that the state may consider whether it has the
resources available and whether the placement is a reasonable
accommodation.83  As shown, quality alternatives to
institutionalization exist. However, as will be discussed, the focus of
75. Id. at 43.
76. Id. at 71.
77. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
78. Id. at 587.
79. Id. at 588.
80. Id. at 589-90.
81. Id. at 591-92.
82. Id. at 587.
83. Id.
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the LPS Act is on limiting confinement with little thought to
treatment.
II. The Arguments in Favor of Limiting Involuntary
Commitment Leave the Gravely Disabled Mentally Ill to
"Die with Their Rights On"
A substantial number of mentally ill people will go untreated
unless there is involuntary commitment. Many mentally ill people
have impaired decision-making capacity and therefore do not have
the insight into their disease required to recognize the need for
treatment. ' With its strong emphasis on due process rights, the LPS
Act is "protecting their civil liberties much more adequately than [it
is] protecting their minds and their lives."85 The LPS Act exacerbates
the problems of mental illness by making it difficult to provide
involuntary commitment and by not articulating a right to quality
treatment.
A. The LPS Act and Capacity
The LPS Act embodies a fundamental misapprehension of what
constitutes mental illness. States have defined mental illness as an
impairment of thought processes. For example, the Indiana Code
defines mental illness as a "psychiatric disorder which substantially
disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the
person's ability to function. 8 1 If mental illness is defined by a
condition where people cannot think with sufficient precision to care
for themselves, it seems reasonable that the state, acting in concert
with a knowledgeable mental health professional, should be able to
substitute its judgment when it finds, through an evidentiary hearing,
that the patient is incompetent. Substitution of judgment is not a
novel concept. Parents make decisions for children because 'm]ost
children.., simply are not able to make sound judgments."8  The
state even has control over parental discretion when the child's
health-mental or physical-is in jeopardy.8"
Commentators who disagree with involuntary commitment laws
note that there are many homeless who are not mentally ill but who
would also benefit from state provided care and treatment. 89 This
argument points out that the state does not, and cannot, confine
84. See TORREY, supra note 8, at 156-63.
85. Id. at 141
86. IND. CODE § 16-14-9.1-9(g) (2000).
87. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
88. Id.
89. Morse, supra note 18, at 95-96.
homeless people against their will.9" The state allows people who
prefer homelessness to choose this lifestyle. These commentators see
great hypocrisy in only providing care and treatment for the mentally
ill. 9' Other commentators analogize mental illness to physical illness
using a similar argument. As Professor Winick points out, "a
patient with cancer or heart disease is not involuntarily treated, but a
patient with schizophrenia or depression may be."92 This argument
illustrates how commentators mischaracterize mental illness. The
state lets people choose homelessness because they are capable of
making this choice. Arguments in favor of permitting the gravely
disabled to make treatment decisions fail to account for the fact that
many are not competent to do so. There is simply no meaningful
analogy between a person with cancer who is otherwise able to take
care of himself and a person so disabled by schizophrenia that he
cannot. To allow gravely disabled mentally ill people the full panoply
of decisionmaking rights afforded to competent adults misconceives
the nature of mental illness.
B. The MacArthur Study
The capacity of the mentally ill to make decisions about their
treatment is one of the most controversial aspects of mental illness
law. In an effort to provide information about the ability of the
mentally ill to make treatment decisions, Paul S. Appelbaum and
Thomas Grisso developed an elaborate research project called the
MacArthur Study. " They rated the ability of people suffering from
schizophrenia, depression, and ischemic heart disease to understand
relevant information regarding their disease, appreciate the nature of
their situation and its likely consequences, manipulate information
rationally, and communicate a choice.94  When they compared
subjects of all three groups, the schizophrenic group differed in
treatment decisionmaking from the other two groups and the
depression group differed from the medically ill group. However,
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and
Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 137, 139 (1996).
93. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study 1: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
105 (1995) [hereinafter MacArthur I]; Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to
Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995) [hereinafter MacArthur II]; Thomas Grisso
& Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study III. Abilities
of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149
(1995) [hereinafter MacArthur III].
94. MacArthur I, supra note 93.
95. MacArthur III, supra note 93, at 167.
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although the mentally ill patients scored significantly lower on
measures of understanding, appreciation, and reasoning, there was
considerable heterogeneity within each group. 6  The majority of
schizophrenic patients did not manifest deficits in decision-making
ability, and the researchers attributed the lower overall score to a
minority within that group. The researchers warn that the results
may have underestimated the deficits of the mentally ill since they did
not enroll patients who were most acutely disturbed in the study.
Based on these results, it is evident that the MacArthur Study
provides information that is useful in the context of competency
hearings. The fact that mentally ill patients show a great deal of
heterogeneity in thinking patterns should lead to recognition that
individualized hearings are necessary. 99  In order to obtain true
informed consent, doctors must explain the disease and treatment
carefully, and there must be an inquiry into a patient's reason for
refusing treatment.' ° Although some commentators believe that the
MacArthur Study refutes the assumption that mentally ill patients
differ in their decision-making capacity, 9' the results of the study are
of limited value for two reasons. First, it is difficult to develop a
research tool to measure capacity and second, it excluded the group
most affected by this study, the gravely disabled.
Some commentators have pointed out that the MacArthur Study
does not, and could not, provide a reliable "capacimeter" or tool to
accurately measure capacity.' Professors Kapp and Mossman liken
the search for a reliable and accurate way to assess mental decision-
making capacity to a search for the "Holy Grail."10 3 Although the
MacArthur Study provides important contributions in evaluating and
characterizing different types of decision-making impairments, it does
not provide determinations of legal incompetence to consent to
treatment." A single test and score can never account for the variety
of medical, legal, ethical, and other factors that inform a competency
decision' 5 Both evaluators and patients produce unreliable results;
"[s]ubjectivity, idiosyncrasy, and lack of sufficient reliability among
capacity evaluators all combine to limit the accuracy and fairness of
96. Id. at 168.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Winick, supra note 92, at 137.
100. Id. at 149-50.
101. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: A Summary of the MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study and an Introduction to the Special Theme, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 4 (1996).
102. Marshall B. Kapp & Douglas Mossman, Measuring Decisional Capacity: Cautions
on the Construction of a "Capacimeter," 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 73 (1996).
103. Id. at 73.
104. Id. at 75.
105. Id. at 87-88.
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capacity assessments, both in the process of conducting them and in
gauging their results."'" Furthermore, the subjects of the study differ
markedly in education, language, cultural background, and
ethnicity."
Performance on standardized tests of capacity may be affected by
such factors in a way that reveals little or nothing about an
individual's cognitive and emotional abilities to engage in a rational
decision-making process once information is explained and choices
are presented in a manner that is understandable and relevant to
that person. 08
The MacArthur Study should be recognized for its value, albeit
limited. The study does tend to show that people who are mentally ill
and impaired in some mental functioning may still be capable of
making rational treatment decisions. Mental illness does not
necessarily mean incompetence. In fact, there should be no
presumption of incompetence at all; the state should have the burden
of proving incompetence. Nevertheless, for people who are gravely
disabled, there should be an inquiry into the patient's competence
and nothing in the MacArthur study refutes the need for a searching
inquiry of this type. Since the MacArthur Study excluded those with
grave mental illnesses, the study does not show that people who are
gravely disabled are competent decision makers, or even that they
usually make competent decisions. The MacArthur Study excluded
this group and only looked at schizophrenia and depression.
However, the study found that the more severe the disorder, the
more likely the subject would be unable to make a competent
treatment decision.' ° The study attributes the poor performance of
the mentally ill groups to a minority comprised of the most mentally
ill subjects.' 0 The study never establishes that mentally ill people are,
across the board, able to make treatment decisions. If anything, this
study supports the argument that some mentally ill people have
impaired decision-making ability. Furthermore, some commentators
believe the MacArthur Study provides grounds to set the bar higher
for involuntary confinement.
106. Id. at 78-79.
107. Id. at 84.
108. Id.
109. See MacArthur III, supra note 93, at 169.
110. Id. at 173.
111. See, e.g., Trudi Kirk & Donald N. Bersoff, How Many Procedural Safeguards Does
It Take to Get a Psychiatrist to Leave the Lightbulb Unchanged? A Due Process Analysis of
the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 45 (1996).
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III. The LPS Act Does Not Sufficiently Provide for Treating
the Gravely Disabled Mentally Ill
While limiting confinement is a problem, once a person is
committed, the LPS Act guards personal liberty by sacrificing the
right to receive treatment for mental illness. Under Roulet, the state
may only establish a conservatorship if it can prove mental illness
beyond a reasonable doubt.'12  The court reasoned that any
commitment constitutes incarceration, even if it is for the benefit of
medical treatment."3 The court explained that since civil commitment
is such a significant deprivation of liberty, equivalent to confinement
in the criminal context, it should require the same stringent burden of
proof so as not to confine an innocent (mentally competent) person."'
This reasoning was expanded in Conservatorship of Rodney M.," 5
making it even more difficult to establish a conservatorship. Here,
the court found that, while only a unanimous jury can establish a
conservatorship, three-fourths of the jury can find that the person is
not gravely disabled."6 This analysis grew out of Roulet's concerns
that the consequences of erroneous commitment are so grave that
"[i]t would be small solace to a person wrongly judged mentally
incompetent that his road to commitment was paved with good
intentions... This court found that the double standard was in line
with Roulet's objective of protecting people from an unjustified
conservatorship." Thus, because of California's concern that people
will erroneously be found gravely disabled, the courts have created a
situation where it is infinitely easier to find someone not disabled
than to provide help.
The court's analysis also overlooks an important difference
between civil and criminal commitment. To equate criminal
confinement with civil commitment misconstrues the purpose of the
commitment: to treat mental illness. Though treatment, without
more, should not validate confinement, the court does not account for
the fact that the treatment process provides potential for review.
Contrary to the view the court gives, a confined mentally ill person is
not alone in his illness."9 Rather, there are daily opportunities for
doctors and nurses, as well as visiting family and friends, to review the
112. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
113. Id. at 7-10.
114. Id.
115. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1996).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 516 (citing Roulet, 590 P.2d 1).
118. Id.
119. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
person's progress."' Furthermore, as underfunded as mental
institutions are, there is no incentive to confine someone who does
not need treatment.'
2
Using these arguments, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's
procedures to commit a mentally ill child without a hearing. The
Court noted that in the mental health system, a single physician does
not have "unbridled discretion., 122 A finding that mental institutions
exercise unlimited powers would require an assumption that the
many doctors and nurses involved in treatment, and who review each
other are either indifferent to the patient's welfare or incompetent.1
2
1
The Court was unwilling to make this determination. There is,
therefore, ample evidence to believe that the chance of committing
someone who is not mentally ill on a long-term basis is minimal.
The Roulet court also reasoned that the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard is necessary to safeguard against the stigma of having
a conservator.125 While this is a valid point, the court fails to take
account of the fact that acting "crazy" in a society that is, at best,
apathetic to mental illness, is stigmatizing.
The Supreme Court noted that a significant source of social
stigma comes from the illness itself, not from the state, which labels a
person by providing medical treatment.1 26 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court agreed with psychiatric research showing that the stigma
following hospitalization is not a major problem, but that "[d]ischarge
[from a mental hospital] before disturbed behavior is well controlled
may advance the patient into an inhospitable world that can incubate
the chronicity that was to be avoided in the first place.' 27 In Parham,
the court found that:
120. Id.
121. Morse and other commentators point out the lack of funding as one reason not to
confine. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. It seems unreasonable, if the
figures are as dire as they say, to turn around and argue that doctors would allow an
overflow of patients. If institutions are underfunded, doctors would be hard pressed to
hospitalize a person who they felt did not require treatment.
122. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 615 (1979). Parham actually took this argument from
Addington. In Addington, the Court found that "even though an erroneous confinement
should be avoided in the first instance, the layers of professional review and observation of
the patient's condition, and the concern of family and friends generally will provide
continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected." 441 U.S. at 428-
29.
123. Parham, 442 U.S. at 615.
124. Id. at 615-16.
125. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1979).
126. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-01.
127. Id. at 601 n.13 (1979) (citing Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, Psychiatric Labeling
and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, in 31 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY
334 (1974)).
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[a]ppellees overlook a significant source of the public reaction to
the mentally ill, for what is truly 'stigmatizing' is the symptomology
of a medical or emotional illness. The pattern of untreated,
abnormal behavior-even if nondangerous-arouses at least as
much negative reaction as treatment that becomes public
knowledge. A person needing, but not receiving, appropriate
medical care may well face even greater social ostracism resulting
from the observable symptoms of an untreated disorder."
The Fourth District Court of Appeal used Parham's analysis to
find that the appropriate standard of proof to justify certification was
preponderance of the evidence, specifically rejecting the reasonable
doubt standard.9 The recognition of the stigma that comes from
acting "crazy" should have been considered in Roulet.13° Although
well intentioned, a reasonable doubt standard for involuntary
treatment is unnecessary. Several states have adopted the clear and
convincing standard because it protects against misuse and allows for
treatment when needed.' Furthermore, the rationale of protecting
against stigma is illogical because stigma also attaches perhaps to a
greater degree to those who act abnormally and to those who enter
the criminal justice system.
Following these decisions, it seems that Roulet's analysis is
neither the most sensible nor the only solution for involuntary
treatment of the mentally ill. Many other states do not use the strict
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, preferring instead the standard
the Supreme Court articulated in Addington.3 At issue in Addingtoo
128. Parham, 442 U.S. at 601.
129. In re Azzarella, 254 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 927-28 (Ct. App. 1989).
130. Although neither the LPS Act nor the Probate Code specify a standard of proof to
appoint a conservator, the standard necessary to appoint a conservator under the Probate
Code is only the clear and convincing standard, as opposed to the reasonable doubt
standard required for LPS Act cases. Conservatorship of Sanderson, 165 Cal. Rptr. 217,
222 (1st Dist. 1980). This lowered standard does not pose due process problems because a
conservator for probate purposes does not attach as much stigma and does not include the
power to commit, though many rights and privileges are nonetheless stripped from the
conservatee. Id. This situation is counter-intuitive for a number of reasons. First, if there
is stigma surrounding conservatorship and allowing someone else complete power over
your life then it seems equal in both situations. The only difference is the label "crazy"
which is stigmatizing in its own right and not from the conservatorship. Furthermore, the
power to commit is the power to treat, so it seems that a conservator's job under the LPS
Act is more important than that under the Probate Code.
131. See infra note 132.
132. See A. E. v. Mitchell, 724 F.2d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that under Utah
law, a court may order hospitalization if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
person is gravely disabled); In re Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. 1993) (citing a statute
that provides that a court or jury shall determine if a person is in need of care if the court
or jury finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is gravely disabled as a
result of mental illness); In re Commitment of G.M., 743 N.E.2d 1148, 1150-53 (Ind. App.
2001) (finding that conclusion of "gravely disabled" was supported by clear and convincing
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was the question of what minimum standard of proof was needed to
adequately protect due process rights in the involuntarily
commitment process.133 The Supreme Court began by pointing out
that a given standard of proof instructs a factfinder about the degree
of confidence society thinks it should have in the correctness of its
conclusion; increasing this burden can impress the factfinder with the
importance of the decision." The Court concluded that, because
commitment requires a deprivation of liberty, a higher standard than
mere preponderance of the evidence is required." The Court also
relied on the fact that mental health professionals do not require a
higher standard and, given the lack of certainty in the diagnostic
process, it is questionable whether the state could ever prove mental
illness beyond a reasonable doubt.'36 A higher level of proof would
require a stricter standard than the medical community itself requires,
thereby denying treatment to a significant number of mentally ill
people; "[s]uch 'freedom' for a mentally ill person would be
purchased at a high price." 37
Furthermore, in contrast to the criminal justice system, where it
is better to let a guilty person go free than to convict an innocent
person, someone who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness
that requires treatment is not "wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. It
cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be
committed.' '8 This is further supported, according to the Court, by
the fact that, while erroneous commitments should be avoided, unlike
criminal detention, commitment provides an ongoing opportunity for
review by friends, family, and doctors.'9 It is far more practical and
helpful to lower the standard to the point where most people who
need help will receive it, especially in light of the fact that those who
are erroneously caught in this net will be able to escape. Thus, the
Court found that the clear and convincing evidence standard
accurately reflected the balance of interests between an individual's
freedom and society's parens patriae interest.
4
evidence when there was testimony that patient was often covered in his own vomit and
excrement and had suicidal and homicidal ideations); In re J.C., 790 So. 2d 656, 657 (La.
Ct. App. 2001) (finding that commitment under the Mental Health Law requires a
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the person is gravely disabled as a result of
mental illness).
133. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419-420 (1979).
134. Id. at 424-27.
135. Id. at 427.
136. Id. at 429-30.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 429. (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 428-29.
140. Id. at 426-27.
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Some commentators have argued that the miserable conditions
found in the institutions themselves are another reason to limit
confinement of the mentally ill.'4' Professor Morse argues that
because of inadequate funding and conditions, which have been a
hallmark of state-run facilities, "to maintain that involuntary
commitment is ultimately beneficial... is to propagate a cruel
myth." '142 This argument sidesteps the point. The argument that many
state mental hospitals are underfunded and inadequate is not a
sufficient reason to withhold confinement and treatment. If true, the
solution should be to fix the system, not to deny healthcare.
Furthermore, inpatient programs at mental institutions are not the
only alternative. State funding of community treatment programs is
less expensive and more effective.'43 These programs are less
restrictive and, therefore, fit in well with state and federal law.
Though it would be wrong to take away an individual's liberty in
the guise of treating mental illness and simply confine him with no
hope of therapy, it does not follow that such a terrible possibility
should be used as an excuse for not treating the mentally ill. Taken to
its logical conclusion, this argument would preclude children from
attending public schools because the educational system is
underfunded and often unsuccessful. The Fifth Circuit adopted a far
more reasonable solution in Aderholt, declaring that the state owes a
duty to provide adequate care to people confined through involuntary
commitment. 1" The court stated that people confined in this way
have a constitutional right to treatment.4 . "The failure to provide
suitable and adequate treatment to the mentally ill cannot be justified
by lack of staff or facilities."'46  This analysis has a far more
therapeutic effect than Morse's approach of liberating the mentally ill
because the state does not provide adequate treatment.
Although it may offend our sense of liberty,' 7 the best approach
to treatment for those people who cannot provide for their basic
141. Morse, supra note 18, at 79-84. Morse actually spends only one paragraph
describing the situation. He argues that many doctors are unqualified, staffing is
inadequate, and "satisfactory treatment is a myth." Id.
142. Id.
143. TORREY, supra note 8, at 116-118.
144. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1974).
145. Id.
146. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (citing Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
147. The journalist Charles Krauthammer also noted this dilemma:
In fact the homeless mentally ill are abandoned, not free. Nor is their degraded
condition at all inevitable. It is the result not of mysterious determining forces,
but of the failed, though well-intended social policy. And social policy can be
changed. In this case, it will not be easy. There will be a lot of thundering from
civil libertarians. But it certainly can be done.
needs due to mental illness is involuntary treatment.4 8 Involuntary
processes should be available for continuous treatment and not solely
for crises. Many states have revised their statutes to broaden criteria
for involuntary commitment.'19 Hawaii's statute allows commitment
for people that are "obviously ill," defined as a "condition in which a
person's current behavior and previous history of mental illness, if
known, indicate a disabling mental illness, and the person is incapable
of understanding that there are serious and highly probable risks to
health and safety involved in refusing treatment."5 The American
Psychiatric Association proposed a model law, eventually defeated by
mental health lawyers, which would have allowed involuntary
commitment for people who need treatment due to behavior
indicating "significant deterioration......
California should be thus guided and change the LPS Act to
allow for commitment based on the need for treatment. One only has
to look to the nearest park bench, bridge, or abandoned building to
see that the voluntary outreach services that try to persuade the
mentally ill to seek treatment have failed. As a direct result of
impaired decision-making, many mentally ill people do not believe
that anything is wrong with them and see no reason to accept
hospitalization.
They know the CIA implanted electrodes in their brain that are
producing the voices. They know they own the White House. They
know they are loved by a famous movie star. They know they are
being followed and watched 24 hours a day. And no amount of
education or persuasion is going to change their minds.'52
Research suggests that twice as many people would be eligible for
treatment if it was based on need-for-treatment criteria, rather than
the existing standards.'53 This means that a significant number of
people who need help will not receive it under the LPS Act's
procedures. Furthermore, as noted before, involuntary treatment
does not necessarily require inpatient settings. Outpatient
commitment, which is a court order requiring the mentally ill person
to take medication and comply with the treatment plan, is less
restrictive and can be very successful.
TORREY, supra note 8, at 162-63.
148. Id. at 156.
149. Id. at 158.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 156-57 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 157.
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California's effort to help the mentally ill should center on
community-based treatment combined with increased funding.154
Research on outpatient commitment showed that people in
outpatient programs were more likely to take their medication and
follow their treatment plan. Furthermore, such patients were less
likely to require re-hospitalization, and their violent behavior was
substantially reduced. 55 In order to provide care for California's
mentally ill, some form of involuntary treatment may be necessary.
A. There Is No Right to Treatment Under the LPS Act
In addition to limiting availability of treatment, the LPS Act does
not establish the right to treatment. California case law provides that
a mentally ill person may be confined if that person, as a result of
mental illness, is found gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt."6
However, a person found gravely disabled by hearing or granted a
conservator has the right to refuse treatment unless adjudged
incompetent in a separate hearing by clear and convincing evidence.'
Thus, it is possible to deprive someone of freedom, and not provide
treatment. This result seems far more unjust than also requiring
treatment. It seems that the only justification for depriving someone
of liberty in this way should be for treatment.
Under California law, a court must reach a judicial determination
of incompetence, in a hearing that is separate from the commitment
or conservatorship proceedings, before doctors can administer
154. On September 28, 2002, Governor Gray Davis signed Laura's Law, a law that
would allow a court to order outpatient treatment for those defined in Health and Safety
Code section 5600.3. A.B. 1421 (Cal 2002). The bill creates an assertive community
treatment program, albeit temporarily (until January 1, 2008), which involves community-
based care from multidisciplinary teams with high staff to patient ratios. Id. In justifying
the new legislation, the bill cited findings from a Rand Corporation Report that shows
people with "psychotic disorders and those at risk for poor outcomes benefit from
intensive mental health services provided in concert with a sustained outpatient
commitment order." Id. The program also includes periodic doctor reports (at least every
sixty days) and medication will not be forced absent a separate order. Id. However,
participation in this program is voluntary and counties must pay for it themselves. Id. See
also FOLLOW UP EDITORIAL, http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/
archive/2002/10/02/ED28585.DTL (last visited Oct. 25, 2002). In enacting this legislation,
California has become one of the last states to create outpatient treatment; only nine other
states have yet to create this type of program. See HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERVICE,
FACT SHEET: OUTPATIENT CIVIL COMMITMENT, http://www.ncsl.organization/programs/
health/hpts/commit.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
155. TORREY, supra note 8, at 160. Furthermore, a recently released report by the
National Council on Disability indicates that this lack of community-based services results
in the unnecessary institutionalization that California is trying to avoid. Report Says
Mental Health System Not Meeting Needs, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 17, 2002, at A4.
156. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1979).
157. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211 (Ct. App. 1987).
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treatment, since incompetence is not presumed from a finding of
grave disability.5" While the MacArthur Study points out that
incompetence cannot be presumed from mental illness itself, it never
establishes that a gravely disabled person will make competent
decisions. The LPS Act begs the question, how can a person be so
disabled from a mental disorder that he is unable to provide for his
own needs and still be legally competent? It cannot be that one
justification serves as a basis for depriving liberty, but this same
justification does not serve as a basis for treatment.
Idaho disagrees with California's standard, opting for a single
standard to prove incompetence and grave disability.'5" This standard
is lower than the reasonable doubt standard California uses, though
the Idaho Supreme Court found it is stringent enough to protect
liberty interests.' As the court pointed out:
[c]onsidering the general intent of the legislature in adopting the
Act, 6 there is no valid reason to require clear and convincing
evidence to commit a patient, and then impose a different standard
for a determination of capacity to make decisions regarding
treatment. Given the significant interests involved, and to ensure
uniform evidentiary standards are applied to commitment cases, we
hold that a finding of lack of capacity to make an informed decision
about treatment must also be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.62
This standard recognizes the connection between a
determination to commit and a determination of incompetence.
Though these hearings may represent different aspects of the
problem, they require similar evidence and expert testimony. There
is simply no reason to have a different burden for a finding of
incompetence. The requirement of multiple hearings, with effectively
the same burdens of proof, illustrates how the LPS Act has been
pieced together with little thought to the population it serves. The
Idaho system is more rational and protective of the interest in
treating the mentally ill than the California standard. However, the
Idaho system also needlessly requires two separate hearings, which is
a waste of judicial resources and of time, resulting in delayed
treatment.
Even more effective is Utah's scheme. The statutory definition
of mental illness states that the person must lack the ability to provide
the "necessities of life" and to engage in a rational decision-making
158. Id. at 1315.
159. See Bradshaw v. Idaho, 816 P.2d 986, 990 (Idaho 1991).
160. Id. at 989.
161. The intent of the legislature in enacting this act is the same as the LPS Act. See
IDAHO CODE §66-329 (Michie 1991).
162. Bradshaw, 816 P.2d at 990.
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process regarding medical treatment. '  The Tenth Circuit faced a
constitutional challenge to this statute in A.E. v. Mitchell.'64 In this
case, mental patients claimed that it was unconstitutional to be
forcibly medicated without a prior judicial determination of
incompetence. 65  In applying the Utah code, the appellate court
agreed with the district court that "[o]nly those who are incompetent
to consent to treatment can be committed under the statute."' 66 Thus,
the Utah statute is both protective of the individual's liberty interest
yet provides an efficient process whereby those with severe mental
illness are treated. The focus is on treatment; those involved are not
diverted by multiple and repetitive hearings.
This procedure of making confinement and conservatorship
available (which the California Supreme Court argues is
stigmatizing)' 67 without allowing administration of therapy is a result
of the LPS Act's omission of an explicit right to treatment. While one
purpose of the LPS Act is to help the mentally ill, it is difficult to
imagine how this will be accomplished if there is no right to
treatment, or as Torrey terms it, no "right to get well.' 68
Many courts have found that committing people involuntarily
without providing treatment raises troubling constitutional
questions 9 The Fifth Circuit first battled this issue in a series of
cases in Alabama.'7 ° In 1971, the guardians of a group of confined
patients brought a class action suit to establish that the program at the
hospital was scientifically and medically inadequate and, thus,
deprived the patients of their constitutional rights. 17' The district
court agreed, finding that there is no legal or moral justification for
holding involuntarily committed patients in custodial care without
adequate treatment.7 1 Patients involuntarily confined have a
constitutional right to treatment that will give them a reasonable
opportunity to be cured. 173 Failure to provide adequate treatment,
according to the court, "violates the very fundamentals of due
163. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(10) (2000).
164. 724 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1983).
165. Id. at 865.
166. Id. at 867.
167. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1979).
168. TORREY, supra note 8, at 141-66.
169. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 492 (D. Minn.
1974); Nason v. Bridgewater State Hosp., 233 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Mass. 1968).
170. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F.
Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd
sub nom Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974).
171. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
172. Id. at 785.
173. Id. at 784-85.
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process.' ' 74 In 1972, the district court declared that these patients
have a constitutional right to "such individual rehabilitation as will
give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a more useful and
meaningful life and to return to society.", 7' The Fifth Circuit affirmed
and held that "where the justification for commitment was treatment,
it offend[s] the fundamentals of due process if treatment were not in
fact provided.'
176
Other district courts have agreed with this analysis. Before the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Wyatt line; one district judge ruled that due
process requires that people committed for mental disability receive
minimally adequate treatment for a reasonable opportunity to be
cured. 77 Both Wyatt and Welsch were grounded in constitutional law,
and not solely on the state's statutory scheme. Thus, it is possible for
a state to find a constitutional right to treatment, and California
would protect this right by following suit.
Though never declaring a right to treatment, the Supreme Court
in Youngberg v. Romeo found that the due process clause creates a
constitutionally protected interest in providing a reasonable level of
minimally adequate training for a profoundly mentally disabled adult
who was involuntarily committed.' The Court noted that an
involuntarily committed person is completely dependent on the state,
which owes a duty to provide certain care. 7' By balancing the
patient's liberty interests with those of the state, the Court concluded
that minimally adequate training would protect the patient's interest
in "safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints.' 8 Although
the Supreme Court is unlikely to expand Youngberg to establish a
constitutional right to treatment for the mentally ill, California may
establish this right through statute. California could use Youngberg
as a guide in establishing such a right.
Looking at cases that do grant a right to treatment, it logically
follows that this right should include administration of psychotropic
drugs. Patients who receive psychotropic drug therapy are more
likely to be able to lead normal lives and respond to behavioral
therapy. 8' It also follows that if patients are unable to make
treatment decisions competently, then the right to treatment extends
to forced administration. Although Youngberg required leaving a
174. Id. at 785.
175. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 390.
176. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974).
177. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974).
178. 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
179. Id. at 317.
180. Id. at 322.
181. See TORREY, supra note 8, at 6, 50-51. See also infra notes 184-187 and
accompanying text.
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patient free from undue restraints, this requirement would not be
violated by a statute that forced care on someone who does not have
the capacity to make the decision himself.
Furthermore, there are consequences for patients who do not
receive treatment through psychotropic drugs. "A tragic
consequence of the efforts of mental health lawyers to make it
difficult to hospitalize and treat the mentally ill is that the person's
symptoms may irreversibly worsen."' 82 Frequently, failure to take
medication results in increased violence.183 According to one study,
institutionalized patients not treated with psychotropic drugs were
more likely to be subjected to physical forms of restraint.'9 In the
year after the Rogers decision, which made it easier for patients to
refuse treatment, seclusion and restraint of patients who refused
treatment increased from 244 patients and 5,868 hours to 392 patients
with a total of 11,855 hours. 185 Treatment was also more likely to be
interrupted when these patients were moved to different wards. 8 6 In
another Massachusetts study, the data revealed that courts
overturned refusals for twenty out of twenty-two patients, but their
treatment was delayed an average of four and a half months while
waiting for a court hearing.8 7 Perhaps ironically, forcing a person to
undergo drug therapy, where that person's capacity to make decisions
is impaired by mental illness, might actually result in more freedom.
One alternative that guarantees freedom would simply be to
refuse to confine the mentally ill. Those who agree with Morse's view
would embrace this proposal, yet it seems like a drastic shift and
would fail to care for a significant segment of our society. It seems far
more humane to find that the state has a compelling interest in
providing care that outweighs the mentally ill person's interest in
freedom from treatment.
Analogies to other types of mental disability help explain why
the LPS Act process may not be preferable. The California Supreme
182. TORREY, supra note 8, at 152. However, while medication is an important part of
treatment, it is not the entire solution to treating mental illness. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text. The National Council on Disability has advised that treatment should
focus on "serving the whole person, and not merely the most obvious symptoms."
TORREY, supra note 8, at 152.
183. TORREY, supra note 8, at 50-51.
184. ROBERT D. MILLER, M.D., PH.D., INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE
MENTALLY ILL IN THE POST-REFORM ERA 150 (1987).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 151.
188. A National Institute of Mental Health panel met in 1989 to create a plan to
improve services for the mentally ill and noted that "[one could argue that in the name of
individual liberty we have moved to a system that is a much greater danger to life and the
pursuit of happiness than the one it replaced." TORREY, supra note 8.
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Court held that it is constitutional to have a physician as the sole
evaluator to find an elderly person incompetent in order to provide
involuntary medical treatment. In Rains, the court upheld a
challenge to Health and Safety Code section 1418.8, which allows
medical treatment for nursing home patients after a physician
determines the patient's incapacity to consent to treatment. 90 The
court performed a detailed balancing of interests needed to answer
the "difficult and perplexing problem" of how to provide
nonemergency treatment to people who lack the ability to consent
because of incompetence while protecting the due process rights of
the individual.1 91 Rains concluded that the individual's due process
interest in this situation was outweighed by the state's compelling
interest in protecting the needs of the incompetent. 2 Although
patients in nursing homes have a protected privacy right, it is
questionable whether an incompetent patient, whose care is already
extensively regulated by the state and inevitably subject to a
physician's decisions, has a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 93 The
court declined to hold that this invasion would be more serious if
decided by a physician rather than a conservator. 94  Judicial
intervention is not more sensitive to privacy rights since it necessarily
includes involvement of more people.19 ' Moreover, the court found
that due process does not require postponement of medical
intervention until lack of capacity can be established in an adversarial
hearing. 96 Thus, the California Supreme Court found that the
statutory scheme under section 1418.8, which allows a streamlined
system for establishing incompetence (and involuntary medical
treatment) by using the judgment of a medical professional and not
an evidentiary hearing, adequately protects both the privacy interests
and due process rights of elderly people in nursing homes.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has found it
appropriate to rely on the advice of medical professionals. In fact, it
has repeatedly concluded that medical decisions are not within the
province of the courts. In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court
upheld a law permitting administration of medication to mentally ill
prisoners. '97  It also found that allowing a doctor to determine
treatment for mentally ill inmates adequately, and perhaps better,
189. Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 192 (Ct. App. 1995).
190. Id. at 186.
191. Id. at 189.
192. Id. at 201.
193. Id. at 192-94.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 177.
196. Id. at 198.
197. 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990).
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protected their interests than if that decision were made by a judge.'98
In Youngberg, the Court opined that "there is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in
making such decisions" and explained that courts should show
deference to judgments exercised by qualified professionals.'99
Similarly, in Parham the Court stated that the question of whether a
child is mentally ill and can benefit from treatment is "essentially
medical in character."2" Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
refused to find that this discretion will lead to an abuse of power or
prescriptions for reasons other than medical need and has always
upheld the view that the medical profession is dignified enough to
prevent these problems; "indeed the ethics of the medical profession
are to the contrary."20 1
The court in Rains did not reach the LPS Act, noting that the
LPS Act is immune from its analysis since there is a statutory
requirement to find incompetence through judicial review."
However, the situation facing the incompetent elderly seems
strikingly similar to that of the mentally ill. In fact, the court in Rains
based its decision in part on the situation in Washington that allowed
administration of medication to prisoners pursuant to the medical
judgment of a physician, "which is in some ways analogous to section
1418.8. " 203
Absent a statutory requirement for a hearing, which this Note
argues should not exist, treatment for the mentally ill could easily fit
into the Rains scheme. As was convincingly stated in Rains, these are
medical decisions and it is unnecessary and wasteful, at best, and
harms treatment, at worst, to send the case through the judicial
system. "We consider that a practice of applying to a court to confirm
such decisions [to give or withhold medical treatment to a comatose
patient] would generally be inappropriate, not only because that
would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's
field of competence, but because it would be impossibly
cumbersome."'2  Assuming the MacArthur Study is correct in its
conclusion that many mentally ill people are competent to make
treatment decisions, this does not explain the need for such a
cumbersome system to determine incompetence. Following the Rains
198. Id.
199. 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982). Because doctors are more expert in such areas than
are judges, a decision made by a medical professional is "presumptively valid." Id. at 323.
200. 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
201. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 n.8 (1990).
202. Rains v. Belsh, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 190-91 (Ct. App. 1995).
203. Id. at 191.
204. Id. at 198.
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analysis would be far more sensible, would streamline treatment, and
would still protect patients' rights.
IV. Failing to Confine for Treatment Does Not Ensure Liberty:
Many Mentally Ill People Are Imprisoned for Minor Crimes
Unfortunately, failure to commit those with grave mental
disorders in treatment facilities paradoxically results in involuntary
confinement of a different sort. A consequence of this failure is that
they are frequently incarcerated for minor crimes. In fact, in the first
year following the enactment of the LPS Act, the number of mentally
ill people in the prisons rose dramatically."' Most of these arrests
were for misdemeanors and were highly correlated with the
offender's mental illness and corresponding behavior."' Police often
use catch-all charges to sweep mentally ill people off the street2 O
These charges may include petty theft, assault, trespassing, and
disorderly conduct. 28  "Mercy-bookings" by policemen are also
common as a way to protect people the police feel are easily
victimized.2"
The consequences of this situation are drastic. One article in the
Los Angeles Times described the prison system as "the world's
largest mental institution.""2 ' This speculation has been corroborated
with statistics. Depending on the study, researchers investigating the
records of prison inmates have found that between six to eight
percent suffer from a serious psychiatric illness.' Research based on
inmate interviews shows that the number of prisoners with a
205. TORREY, supra note 8, at 36.
206. Id. at 37-38.
207. Id. at 38-39. Often it is local businessmen who prompt this type of police action.
Police in tourist towns routinely arrest the mentally ill. Id. at 39. New Orleans has a well-
known reputation for "cleaning the streets" by arresting homeless people. Id. at 39.
208. Id. at 38-39.
209. Id. at 39-40. This is especially true for mentally ill women who are vulnerable to
assault and rape. Id. Responding to the fact that the local psychiatric hospital discharges
many mentally ill people, one jail official stated, "[i]f the mental institutions will not hold
them, I will." Id. at 39.
210. Helping People off the Streets, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at B12. Baca, the newly
elected Sheriff of Los Angeles, and his staff tried to start a program to break the "jail-to-
streets cycle" that threatens the mentally ill homeless. Id. The article also points out that
the sheriffs' department spends $10 million a year on psychiatric medicine and California
spends $1.8 billion a year arresting, trying, and imprisoning the mentally ill. Id. While
some people are critical of his plan, Baca has shown leadership in attacking the problem.
As he puts it, "[jlail cells should be used to lock up serious criminals, not to house
trespassers with mental illness. And letting people live and die on the sidewalks ought to
be a crime." Id. See also supra note 15. The National Council on Disability report also
commented on how prisons have become the largest source of treatment for people with
mental illness. See supra note 15.
211. TORREY, supra note 8, at 28-31.
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psychiatric disorder jumps to ten to fifteen percent.21 2 Furthermore,
much research indicates that there is a large overlap between the
mentally ill who are homeless and those in jail. One study of people
living in shelters who had previously been hospitalized for mental
illness found that 76% of them had also been arrested."3 By limiting
the numbers to include only schizophrenia, manic-depression, and
severe depression, about ten percent of the prison population in the
U.S. qualifies, which is approximately 159,000 people. 1
This incarceration is particularly unfortunate because people
who are gravely disabled are not necessarily dangerous to others. 15
Moreover, the incarceration of people who are gravely disabled by
mental illness can lead to tragic results. Prison is designed for
criminals and operates by rigid rules that the mentally ill might find
difficult to follow. The bizarre behavior that mentally ill people
display is often met with a lack of understanding and violence by
guards and inmates. 6 Suicide is also common for mentally ill
inmates, and about half of prison suicides are committed by people
who were previously hospitalized for mental illness.217 Furthermore,
incarcerating a mentally ill person is likely to exacerbate their
symptoms, often resulting in solitary confinement sometimes without
any medical treatment. In 1995, a federal judge wrote an opinion
severely criticizing the deplorable conditions facing the mentally ill in
the California jails, citing "a rampant pattern of improper or
inadequate care that nearly defies belief.,
219
Furthermore, once the mentally ill person is part of the criminal
justice system, he suffers from the label of "criminal." Surely, the
stigma of being a criminal is at least as damaging as that of mental
illness. Consequently, if commentators such as Morse were truly
concerned about a "preference for liberty," they would be more
concerned about therapeutic treatment of the mentally ill. As
psychiatrist Darold Treffert explains, "[tihe liberty to be naked in a
padded cell in a county jail, hallucinating and tormented, without
212. Id. at 30.
213. Id. at 30-31.
214. Id. at 31.
215. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 5008(h) (West 1998). The LPS Act provides for
commitment of either people who are dangerous or people who are gravely disabled. Id.
Therefore, although the categories may overlap, someone who is committed because he is
gravely disabled is not necessarily dangerous.
216. TORREY, supra note 8, at 31.
217. Id. at 33.
218. Id. at 34.
219. Id. at 35.
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treatment that ought to be given is not liberty; it is another form of
imprisonment-imprisonment for the crime of being ill."22'
Conclusion
Society's misunderstanding of and lack of sympathy for mental
illness is startling."' The LPS Act embodies this sentiment and, while
it confers power to hospitalize for acute situations, it does not go far
enough in its intervention to actually treat and care for the mentally
ill. By making it easier to confine than to treat, and by failing to
provide a right to adequate treatment, it appears that the LPS Act is
actually more focused on protecting the sane from the insane than
achieving its goal of helping the mentally ill.
The answers to this dilemma are far from clear. Certainly the
solution at the turn of the Nineteenth Century, which involved
indefinite confinement, was too severe and did not benefit the
mentally ill. Yet, the pendulum counter-swing of too little treatment
does not benefit this community either. Now California faces the
situation where it is difficult to confine and even more difficult to
treat someone who is gravely mentally disabled. When confined, the
mentally ill are warehoused in inadequate institutions. The middle
ground, where the solution must lie, is murky. Any solution must find
some way to strike a balance between the Constitutional right to be
free of constraints and the human right to live with dignity.
The first step should be to prioritize treatment. The fact that the
LPS Act does not include a right to treatment means that the state
mental health system can continue to run underfunded hospitals that
provide inadequate care. The solution to helping the mentally ill,
especially those who are homeless, is not to announce their liberty,
complain that the mental health system does not work, and then leave
them alone. This method has not worked in the past and will not
provide effective assistance in the future. California must reprioritize
the LPS Act to make treatment and care a priority. If this is indeed
California's goal, involuntary confinement and treatment must be a
220. Darold A. Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment: A Fourth
Standard for Civil Commitment, in 36 HOSP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259-64
(1985); TORREY supra note 8, at 142.
221. A perfect example of society's apathy for the mentally ill is exhibited by the
Andrea Yates trial. Andrea Yates was convicted of murdering her five children after the
jury deliberated for about thirty minutes. Paul Duggan, Texas Mother Convicted of
Murder: Verdict Is Swift in Bathtub Drownings, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at Al. As
her lawyer said in his closing argument, her actions were no different than if she had a
stroke while driving and killed someone. Id. Yet, the jury there was unsympathetic to this
argument and found her guilty of murder after the short deliberation, even though all
jurors believed she was mentally ill. Dateline Profile: The Jury Speaks; Jury Members
Discuss Andrea Yates' Trial (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 17, 2002).
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possibility. Only by giving up the falsehood of exchanging liberty for
confinement and treatment will California be able to provide care for
a significant segment of its population that will only grow larger
under existing policies.
It is important to remember that this discussion is not only an
academic debate of constitutional law. This state of affairs has actual
and devastating consequences for a significant number of people on a
daily basis. Failing to treat people who are mentally ill and cannot
afford treatment more often than not actually results in homelessness,
imprisonment, and crime directed at them. Deinstitutionalization and
the resulting limitations on the ability to treat the mentally ill has
been a disaster. As Dr. Torrey eloquently writes about the people
affected by this "psychiatric Titanic,"
[t]heir lives are virtually devoid of "dignity" or "integrity of body,
mind, and spirit." "Self-determination" often means merely that
the person has a choice of soup kitchens. The "least restrictive
setting" frequently turns out to be a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a
terror-filled existence plagued by both real and imaginary enemies.
Even one [victim] is too many; hundreds of thousands are a
disgrace.222
The civil rights movement is not wrong. With advanced
medicine mentally ill people can live normal lives in greater numbers
than before. This should lead to states being more careful in
exercising their parens patriae power. However, the pendulum has
swung too far in the backlash of the old "19th century" notions of
mental illness, as Professor Winick terms it.223 Instead of leaving
mentally ill people who are gravely disabled free to irrationally
"choose" a life of homelessness or worse, California should be more
careful in applying the LPS Act. There are more options than the
either/or of freedom and institutionalization. The LPS Act is fraught
with inconsistencies and pitfalls that leave the mentally ill with little
help. The mentally ill citizens of this state deserve a more critical
inquiry into the process of dealing with their problems. The policy
California chooses to deal with this problem has too profound an
effect on too many people not to choose carefully.
222. TORREY, supra note 8, at 11.
223. Winick, supra note 92, at 140, 161.
January 20031

